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I.

1. "Humanae Vitae" and Natural Law: Introductory Remarks
The encyclical "Humanae Vitae" teaches that contraception violates
natural law. "Natural law" however is a rational standard for dividing
actions into "good" and "bad" ones - a standard springing from man's
natural reason - and that's why it is first of all a philosophical issue. In
order to show that contraception is the wrong thing to do for everybody, I
think, the basic argument will therefore be an argument on the
philosophical level. Yet, the encyclical's "Humanae Vitae" aim was to teach
authoritatively the Church's doctrine about true responsible parenthood but not to give a thorough rational argument for its substantiation. As far as
natural law is concerned, this has to be assigned to further philosophicalethical analysis. To provide such an analysis and to offer a proper naturallaw argument against contraception is the aim of this paper.
Someone might nevertheless object that there is a rational and
philosophically relevant argumentation contained in the encyclical itself.
Admittedly, "Humanae Vitae" not only pronounces some ethically relevant
anthropological principles but also includes arguments which obviously are
aiming at justifying these principles, as well as it draws pretty concrete
moral conclusions from them. The fundamental contention asserts that
contraception violates natural law and that for this very reason it
contradicts God's will and His loving design over man. But does "Humanae
Vitae" provide an answer to the question why contraception violates
natural law?
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Surprisingly, most cntlclsm of " Humanae Vitae" was based on the
assumption that the very wording of the encyclical actually did provide such
an answer, and that this answer was simply derived from a naturalistic and
"biological" understanding of natural law. According to these critics,
"Humanae Vitae" teaches that the biological patterns inherent in the
human generative faculty must never be acted against, but respected.
"This", a well known critic has asserted, "is undoubtedly the philosophy
underpinning the argumentation of the whole encyclical. It goes so far as to
declare biological laws as absolutely binding on the conscience of man" .)
Interpreting "Humanae Vitae" in this way, its critics had an easy job in
rejecting its doctrine. But a careful look at the encyclical's text will give
evidence that it never identifies "natural biological laws" with natural law in
the moral sense. Talking in No. 10 about the biological forces of man's
procreative faculty, "Humanae Vitae" mentions therewith only the first and
basic requirement of responsible parenthood: the requirement of knowing
what is going on with one's body and that the laws of this body and its
sexual drives belong to the self of human personality. But other exigencies
of responsible parenthood are added immediately: The requirement of
exerting dominion by reason and will over one's "innate drives and
emotions"; the requirement of either "prudently and generously" deciding
"to have a large family" or, "for serious reasons and with due respect to the
moral law", choosing "to have no more children for the time being or even
for an indeterminate period"; finally the requirement of integration of all
these aspects into the "0 bjective moral order instituted by God, - the order
of which a right conscience is the true interpreter". Up to this point
obviously nothing has been determined about what the requirements of this
"objective moral order" concretely are.
In its No . II the encyclical mentions the "laws of nature and the
incidence of fertility" which, as a sign of God's wisdom, are granting a
certain spacing of births. Yet, "Humanae Vitae" does not contend thereby
that these "laws" are instituting a moral order; that is, that they are
"natural law" in the moral sense. The existence of biological rhythms of
fertility is mentioned at this place but to draw a fundamental conceptual
distinction: The distinction between voluntarily induced infertility and
naturally given infertility. While the first poses a moral problem, the
second does not. "Humanae Vitae" obviously wants to teach at this point
that the conjugal act performed in naturally (non-voluntary) sterile
periods is pervectly licit; that non-intentional (naturally given) sterility of
the procreative faculty does not deprive sexual intercourse from its
intrinsic value and dignity as expression of marital love and , finally , that
the spacing of births resulting from fertility cycles may be considered as a
sign of the Creator's wisdom. Notwithstanding that, absolutely no reason
is intended to be given here for settling the question why voluntarily
induced sterility is illicit. At this point the encyclical pronounces nothing
but its fundamental teaching that each conjugal act must remain "per se"
open to procreation ("ut quilibet matrimonii usus ad vitam humanam
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procreandam per se destinatus permaneat"), which in the very context
means: It must not be impeded voluntarily to have those procreative
consequences which would result from its naturally given (physiological)
conditions (according to which procreation is not always possible). Thus,
the encyclical wants to show that "openness to procreation" is not a
physical , but an intentional category. 2 But it is not yet pronounced why
this "openness" is a moral requirement.
Only in the following No.12 the encyclical starts arguing that this
doctrine is based on the inseparable connection , established by God, of the
two fundamental meanings of the conjugal act. "Humanae Vitae", now,
teaches four things: First that human sexuality has two fundamental
meanings : the meaning of loving union of the spouses ("unitive meaning")
and the meaning of transmission of human life ("procreative meaning").
Secondly, that according to the design of the Creator these two meanings
are inseparably connected. Thirdly, that man on his own initiative may not
break this connection. And fourthly , "Humanae Vitae" affirms that by
contraception the connection of these two meanings in fact is broken .
'Inseparability Principle' Must Be Understood
The first, second and third one - which jointly form what I shall call the
Inseparability Principle - must first be rightly understood so as to deal
correctly with the last question. The widespread criticism of "Humanae
Vitae" was and still is the one contesting that contraception in fact does
break the connection of these two meanings while periodic continence
does not. Critics thereby contend that the connection of these two
meanings need not be maintained in each single conjugal act. Therewith
they answer in the affirmative a question explicitly brought up by the
encyclical itself (No.3) . "Could it not be admitted ( ... ) that procreative
finality applies to the totality of married life rather than to each single act?"
Critics give their affirmative answer to this question by opposing what
"Humanae Vitae" explicitly teaches in No . 14. The claim was , to put it even
clearer, that a s long as contraception is adopted in the context of a marital
life which is open in its totality to its procreative meaning - that is, as long
as contraception serves only as a means for responsibly limiting or
planning offspring without excluding offspring on principle, there would
not result an y breaking of the connection of the two meanings of the
conjugal act ("Totality Principle"). Moreover, intentional openness to
procreation would be fully maintained. To refer to the Inseparability
Principle in order to show the wrongness of contraception, critics contend,
would be mere question begging .
By faithfull y following this view, critics of the encyclical's teaching
thought, and still think, that periodic continence is only another method of
contraception , the one being a "natural method", the other an "artificial
method". This concentration on the alternative "natural" or "artificial
method" has been a fatally misleading move ; it has led many to miss the
very point at issue and to overlook the crux of the problem. Misled in this
22
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way, they were induced to promote an interpretation according to which
"Humanae Vitae" condemns contraception because of its artificial
character, because of its shortcoming with respect to naturally given
structures. But does "Humanae Vitae" give us any arguments to refute this
false interpretation?
In my opinion, "Humanae Vitae" did not intend to show why
contraception violates the Inseparability Principle; it only affirms that it
does. Likewise , "Humanae Vitae" did not intend to provide a
philosophical (ethical) reason why contraception violates natural law; it
only wanted to affirm that is does. Nor does "Humanae Vitae" explicitly
refer to any definite natural law concept. It applies, in the light of
revelation (Holy Scripture and Tradition), its perennial, prophetical
teaching on the matter to new developments in the field of contraceptive
devices without putting forward a properly philosophical argument,)
However, there clearly exists a leading, phiosophically relevant
perspective underlying the encyclical's teaching, a perspective which also
reflects an important doctrinal development: This perspective is not to
defend the demand ofrespecting natural patterns inherent in the biological
or physiological constitution of man and his generative acts, but to stress
what has been cal/ed4 the "intentionalness of the thing one is doing " by
contracepting, an intentionalness which relates to the nature of the virtue
of chastity and to its specific requirements within the context of
procreative responsibility. This, I think, is the key to a proper
understanding of the encyclical, which , in my opinion, leads to probably
the only way of explaining why contraception violates natural law.

2. Methodological specifications: The perspective of single acts and the
'relevant case'
Before I continue, I have to settle a fundamental methodological
question. When "Humanae Vitae" talks about the procreative meaning of
marital love it explicitly refers not only to marital life in its totality, but, as
was already mentioned, to each single conjugal act. Thus, the perspective
of "Humanae Vitae" consists in providing a moral judgement about a
specific type of action. that is about concrete performance of human acts.
In order to identify the act under question, a most important restriction
has to be effected for methodological reasons . "Contraceptive behavior" is
or can be a complex structure involving several aspects to be distinguished.
The most typical and widespread case of contraceptive behavior consists in
an overall attitude of excluding in part or totally procreative finality from
marital love. In this case, which is the one of primary pastoral concern,
contraceptive behavior has its root on the level of life plans and overall
intentions involved in marital commitment. This life plan consists in
wanting to exclude in part or totally the possible restrictions, burdens, etc.
expected from or imposed by pregnancy and bringing up children, mostly
as a result of other preferences. This is not a case of "reponsible
parenthood", beca use parenthood itself is partly or totally rejected. Much
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more they are acts of restricting or even suppressing the procreative
meaning of marital love altogether. They are intentional acts of
disconnecting in part or totally the unitive meaning of sexual behavior
from its procreative function; spouses, in this case, simply close their
minds , at least partially, to the task of generously transmitting human life.
For this, however, contraception is not the only way, even if nowadays it
may be the most commonly used; but periodic continence, too , can serve
for such a project and is still doing it in some cases. The failure of this
project, however, does not basically consist in contraceptive behavior
itself, but already in the overall intention with which contraception and
also periodic continence are adopted .5
To identify the act of contraception in its "purity" -for analytical reasons,
- we should therefore consider another case, which also is the one the
encyclical "Humanae Vitae" is mostly concerned about: The proper case of
responsible parenthood; the case of spouses who are plainly open to their
parental vocation but for serious reasons, in which they detect God's will,
conclude that they ought not to have any more children, at least for the time
being. "Humanae Vitae" has perfectly sketched this situation when it states
(N o. 16): "It cannot be denied that in each case married couples , for
acceptable reasons, are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid
children and mean to make sure that none will be born." According to the
encyclical's teaching, periodic continence would be perfectly licit in this
case; contraception, however, would not. In this case, one and the same
upright intention leads to a different choice of actions . The intention here is
not to disconnect marital love from its procreative meaning. On the
contrary: The insight of spouses - "We should not have another child" or
"She (I) should not become pregnant" - which is based on serious and
justified reasons, is an insight plainly imbedded in the parental and
procreative meaning of marital love; in both cases, it forms an intention of
avoiding conception (as long as present circumstances, etc. continue),
which is integrated in the very context of procreative responsibility.
Afterwards, however, the choice of conduct, that is, the means chosen
for the sake of avoiding conception, will be different: The contraceptive
choice is a volition to act in a way of preventing sexual intercourse from
being fertile (it is a choice to prevent conception where it is foreseen to
occur, for the sake of avoiding it). The choice of periodic continence, on
the other hand, does not involve the volition of preventing naturally fertile
acts from being fertile , but of avoiding conception by abstaining from
those acts which are foreseen to bring about the consequence of
conception. Why is the former choice wrong, while the latter is not? That
exactly, and only that, is the question which has to be answered. All the
other possible reasons additionally provided to show that contraception
involves moral disorder actually presuppose having resolved this basic
problem.
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3. Some known arguments against contraception
It seems to be useful to talk first about several arguments which intend
to defend the doctrine of "Humanae Vitae". The analysis of these
arguments will help to further clear up the point at issue .
The most traditional of these arguments is the "perverted faculty
argument". held times ago by many of those who some years later rejected
the Church's teaching as it was pronounced in "Humanae Vitae". It is both
amazing and sad to see how most critics of"Humanae Vitae" did hold this
kind of naturalistic theory till quite recently. Later on. some of them began
to consider the "pill" as not violating the integrity of naturally given
structures by assuming that the ovulation-inhibiting pill does nothing but
provoke "artificially" what nature often does spontaneously; but in the
generative faculty. they have asserted. nothing is mutilated and there is no
vitiation in the performance of the procreative act. b Others , abandoning
this rather "naturalistic" way of moral thinking, wholly stopped talking
about "integrity of the generative faculty" and fully subscribed to licitness
of contraceptual practices whatsoever. though without giving up a rather
crudely "physicalist" if not "zoological" view of sexuality .1 When they
finally read "Humanae Vitae", they obviously did not understand that the
encyclical's view was quite a different one. Backed up by mass medias, they
persistently spread the reproach - though without really proving it on the
grounds of the wording of "Humanae Vitae"H - that the perspective
underlying the encyclical's teaching was just this biological concept of
morally binding natural patterns which, as they rightly emphasized, in the
meantime the majority of moral theologians had given up.
I think there is no need at present of explicitly refuting the "perverted
faculty argument" or similar arguments grounded in the need of respecting
natural patterns (in the physiological sense). No serious moralist holds it
nowadays even if critics of"Humanae Vitae" continue to be convinced that
this is what the encyclical really teaches. What Germain Grisez wrote many
years ago about it is still worthwhile being remembered:
'The naturally given structure of the sexual act' - that is a phrase one often
encounters in discussions of contraception. The contention here is that there is no
such thing, if we are talking about the human ocr; for human acts have their
structure from intelligence. Just insofar as an action is considered according to its
naturally given structure. it is to that extent not considered as a human acl- i.e .. as
a moral act - but rather as a physiological process or as instinctive behavior.
Action with a given structure and acts structured by intelligence differ as totally as
nature differs from morality. Nature has an order which reason can consider but
cannot make and cannot alter. Morality has an order which reason institutes by
guiding the acts of the will·

I fully subscribe to this criticism, liking to add that acting against nature
does not automatically imply moralfault; it has always to be shown why a
violation of natural patterns is wrong; "agere contra naturam" is not equal
to "peccare contra naturam". A reason has always to be given why a
violation of nature - e.g. , of the course of the body's natural processes - has
May, 1989
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or has not moral relevance; that is, how it has to be qualified from a moral
point of view.1O Why is contraceptive sexual intercourse not just like
rendering "a man's eating non-nutritive for a day or two", or like installing
"a substitute for lung-breathing by some reversible operation (with a view
to underwater exploration, say)" or like chewing sugarless gum for the
pleasure of chewing, excluding nutrition as the "natural goal" of
chewing?" Thus, an argument against contraception on the grounds of
referring to the naturally given structure of the sexual act does not resolve
anything; it simply begs the question , - provided that one does not want
to maintain that what is naturally given imposes in all cases the moral
obligation of not altering it; which plainly would lead to absurd
consequences. Every argument which tries to defend naturally given
structures from being altered by human intervention needs a further
argument which precisely may not be based on the very "naturalness" of
natural patterns, but which needs to be an additional ethical argument
showing the moral relevance of natural patterns.'2
A second argument is the one I will call the "creationist argument". It
runs as follows: In procreation man is a cooperator with God, Who in
every act of generation immediately creates the human soul. Through
contraception man overrides God's right as a creator, contradicts His
creative will, and claims for himself to be the master over human life.
This argument obviously applies to anti-procreative overall-intentions,
because these aim at withdrawing marital love from its procreative
meaning, that is, from its meaning as cooperation with God's creative love.
Foreclosing the procreative meaning of marital love means overriding
God's creative designs over man and falsifying one's own situation as a
mere cooperator with God.
In the case we are considering, however, this argument seems to lead to
serious difficulties. Consider: The case presupposes the spouses' insight
that they "ought not to have another child at present". And this "ought
not" is ajudgment of conscience which the spouses - supposing they take
conscience seriously - will interpret as God's will. According to the
teaching of the II Vatican Council's pastoral constitution "Gaudium et
spes" (No . 50), the spouses are not only cooperators with God's creative
and loving will , but they also are "interpreters of God's love". Hence, their
task is to cooperate with God's creative love precisely by interpreting what
this love wants them to do ; it is assigned to them to judge in conscience
whether God wants the coming-to-be of a new human being under the
present circumstances of their conjugal life; what equals to judging
whether God at present wants to make use of their loving union creating a
new human being. Our case supposes that spouses rightly have come to the
conclusion that God, at present , does not want them to have another child ;
this conclusion fully involves the consciousness of being both cooperaters
with God and interpreters of His creative love.
Now , if procreation were the only meaning of the conjugal act ,
consequently they should abstain even completely from sexual intercourse.
26
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But they know that procreation is not the only meaning inherent in
sexuality. They may engage in sexual intercourse to express mutual love
even if God wants them to avoid pregnancy for the time being or even
altogether. "If we contracept - they might argue - we shall not necessarily
deprive sexual intercourse from its cooperative meaning; we only will
deprive it from its procreative efficiency. And this - they might assert - we
are allowed to do according to God's will, for we know that He wants us to
avoid pregnancy." Referring at this point to the cooperative aspect of
procreation to refute them, would signify to beg the question; it simply is
not sufficient, because one has not yet proven why depriving intercourse
from its procreative efficency is not an appropriate meansfor cooperating
with God's will ofavoiding conception; that is , why it is not an appropriate
interpretation of how to cooperate with God's creative love. To show this,
one should provide reasons for the wrongness ofthe contraceptive act and
only then derive its implications for cooperation with God 's creative love.
Someone might object: In every act of sexual intercourse which by its
natural condition is fertile and therefore a procreative act , God's creative
intervention is "automatically" involved. Consequently man has no right
to render it infertile; for this would be equal to setting limits to God's
creative power, impeding what only He has a right to dispose of. Man
would usurp the place of God.
To this I should answer: Even if the acts of procreation are, by their very
object, acts of cooperation with the Creator and have therefore to be
considered as something like "God's property", it would not be evident at
all why rendering them infertile by reasons of "procreative responsibility"
should be considered as overriding God's rights. This could be evidenced
only by assuming that through the conjugal act God wants to create a new
human being also in the case of spouses whom at present He wants to
avoid conception. This assumption, however, clearly is self-contradictory,
for it implies God's creative will to be inconsistent. Or else it implies that,
for executing His creative will, God is confined by secondary causes (like
the body's fertility-rhythms). Provided both that God at present wants
spouses to avoid conception and that He fully approves the unitive
meaning of intercourse , it seems much more plausible to suppose that He
does not request single conjugal acts either to keep their actual meaning of
cooperation with a divine act of creation (whether this supposition is
actually sound is precisely the point at issue). This assumption however
can be reasonably argued for on the grounds that spouses kno w that God
does not want to create at present and in their very case a new human life
through their bodily acts, and that the procreative meaning is not the only
meaning of the conjugal act. The only way of saving, at this point, the
creationist argument would be by assuming that what God wants spouses
to do is conditioned by natural patterns; but this is plainly absurd , or at
least it will lead back to the "perverted faculty argument".
Henceforth , the creationist argument will "bite back". For the
contraceptive choice could be justified just on the grounds of "cooperation
May. 1989
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with the Creator", which requires the responsible interpretation of His
will. So it might be asserted that the cooperative meaning of procreation at
present demands an act which prevents intercourse from having
procreative consequences. Thus, one could, without any peril of
inconsistency, assume that cooperation with God's will demands now to
alter a natural pattern for the very sake of fulfilling God's will; an
assumption which, again, is the one at issue. Whoever wants to refute this
contention without being forced to resort to the "perverted faculty
argument" , should give a further reason which precisely should not be
drawn from the cooperative meaning of procreation.
To sum up : Contracepting spouses will concede that by contraception
they withdraw sexual intercourse from being involved in a divine act of
creation. but this, they will argue, they do according to God's will.
Therefore. what has to be proven is why, in order to fulfill God's will of
avoiding conception, it is illicit both to prevent conception (on the
seco ndary-cause-level) and consequently to thereby withdraw the conjugal
act from involvement in the primary-cause's creative act.
So the crucial problem remains far from being resolved. To bring moral
reasoning to a satisfactory and definite solution , the creationist argument
obviously needs a complement. The very crux of the problem is, why the
act of preventing sexual acts from being fertile is not an appropriate means
for responsi bly cooperating with God. Nobody denies that man has no
right to override the Creator's prerogatives , but the crucial question to be
answered is: Whr is the Creators right overridden by contraception? The
reason can be worked out only by giving evidence why contraception in
itself is a wrong means for fulfilling procreative responsibility and thus for
cooperating with God's creative will.
The creationist argument only manifests the real :;ravity of
contraception. once thi s practice has been understood in its intrinsic
wrongness and its contradiction to the demands of the human good .
Moreover. it points out the real gravity of contraception pursued in the
context of the intent of withdrawing marital love from procreative context
I\ ·hate l'er. Indeed, we are allowed to argue that spouses have no right to do
this. because the task of procreation and the bodily acts which render it
possible are not at man's disposal ; they are but realities through which man
cooperates with the Creator. Life is not "made" by men , but "given" by
God through the act of conjugal love. And this spreading out of His divine
creative love is just what God on principle wants married people to
cooperate with. Hence . this is different from the case in which spouses have
reasons of procreative responsibility for the supposition that God at
present does not want to make use of their marital intercourse to spread
the gift of life . Thus. as an argument which refers to "God's rights" within
the context of "responsible parenthood", the creationist argument seems
to fall short of resolving the problem at issue. It overlooks the need for a
moral analysis on the level of the human act which would make out the
"good for man". according to Aquinas's famous dictum : "Non enim Deus
2H
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a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus"l3 .
A further argument is the one which I would like to call the "Contralifewill argument". 14 It intends to show that in the contraceptive act in and of
itself is involved a "contralife will", somewhat similar to a homicidal will.
This argument which, in its exposition is very sophisticated, needs to be
further examined , I think . I have some doubts about the soundness of its
basic assumption, which holds that in and of itself the contraceptive act is
not intentionally related to sexual acts and seeks nothing but "to impede
the beginning of a person's life".
Let me make only a few insufficient remarks: What the argument
claims, I think, would be true only if children came into being
spontaneously; adopting a device which impedes this would then
intentionally be nothing but "impeding the beginning of a person's life".
But babies come into being as a consequence of a human (sexual) act.
Taking, for example, an ovulation-inhibiting pill does, in itself, not impede
babies to come into being; it only impedes ovulation. You cannot take it
with the intention of impeding the beginning of a baby's life, unless you
simultaneously choose to engage in sexual intercourse and for this reason
you choose to prevent intercourse from causing a baby's life by inhibiting
ovulation. Therefore, as it seems to me, contraception only seeks to
prevent sexual intercourse from causing the beginning of a person's life.
Thus, insofar as intentional relation to "the beginning of new life" is
concerned, the volition involved in a contraceptive choice does not differ
from the volition necessarily involved also in a choice to refrain from
intercourse: In both cases one chooses "not to cause the initiation of new
life". So it does not seem that the difference between contraception and
periodic continence is due to their different intentional relation towards
"the beginning of a person's life", but rather to their different
intentional ness with regard to sexual activity and its being a possible cause
of the initiation of new life.
Finally there is the anthropological argument precisely based on the
doctrine of the inseparable connection of the two meanings of the marital
act. This doctrine, I think, is basic as a starting point and as the
indispensable anthropological background for any argument against
contraception. However, it does not seem to me to be an assumption
sufficient for arguing that also in each single act of contraceptive
intercourse, this connection is denied in a way essentially different from
periodic continence . One might still object that periodic continence and
the intentional limiting of sexual intercourse to infertile periods is simply
another "method" - although not "artificial", but "natural" - of
disconnecting sexual intercourse from its procreative meaning. To simply
state that in contracepting one positively "does" something which
"impedes" conception is not sufficient; it would be nothing but to beg the
question or to resort to the "perverted faculty argument". Rather, it has to
be shown why ''preventing intercourse from causing conception" violates
the Inseparability Principle, while "abstaining from causing conception"
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does not. It is exactly for this purpose that I intend to provide an argument.

4. Description of the relevant case and description of the contraceptive
choice
In further analyses I shall concentrate on the problem of the
contraceptive choice itself as a choice of a determinate sort of human act.
The analysis has to be kept in the context of the mentioned case, which
involves the following descriptive elements:
I. The spouses' mora/~l ' uprighr inrention to avoid pregnancy.
2. Consequently the fact that , in this case, periodic conrinence would be

a licir alrernarive.
3. The at least implicit choice nor 10 adopr periodic continence, that is,
not to abstain from those acts which are foreseen to have procreative
consequences.
4. insread o(choosing periodic conrinence, the choice to adopt means
which prel'enr possibly procreative consequences of all sexual intercourse
performed in any moment. This means can be the "pill", as well as other
chemical, mechanical or surgical techniques such as condoms, IUDs or
sterilization, but also " natural" devices like coirus interruprus. On this level
of argument , this all comes to the same conclusion.
We are thus analyzing contraception as a type of human acr. For the
present purpose, I will suggest the following description (definition) of the
choice of this human act: A conrraceprive choice is rhe choice of an acr rhar
prel'enrs/reelr consenred performances of sexual inrercourse, which are
.foreseen 10 hGl'e procrearil'e consequences, from having rhese consequences, and which is a choice madejusrfor rhis reason. It seems to me
that thi s is a complete description of the contraceptive choice, and it does
not matter whether it refers to contraception within or without marriage.
It involves (I) the intention of engaging in sexual intercourse ; (2) to foresee
that this possibly may cause the initiation of new life; (3) to choose a
performance which prevents this consequence of one's sexual behavior,
and (4) to choose this precisely for the sake of preventing this procreative
consequence. As already has been noted , this description also applies to
onanism by "coitus interruptus", (because this is a device which prevents
actual engaging in sexual intercourse from having procreative consequences) and, on the other hand, it obviously applies mostly to surgical
sterilization. It even covers abortion , insofar as abortion is meant to be
part of a contraceptive policy, that is , insofar as abortion is previously
prol'ided for "neutralizing" or undoing foreseen procreative consequences
of sexual intercourse (in this case abortion involves both the contraceptive
choice and the choice of killing an already existing human being). Notice
that the description of contraception which I adopt is absolutely
independent of what is happening on the physical level for , in order to
resolve the problem at issue , it makes no difference whether one considers
the case of preventing a performed sexual intercourse from being fertile by
taking the pill or the case of interrupting intercourse so as to consummate
30
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it in an onanistic way. Of course there are differences of other kinds, but
they are not relevant in the present context. The suggested description also
disregards the differentiation between "doing" and "refraining from
doing", because coitus interruptus is a kind of "refraining" and because ,
moreover, this description obviously does not apply to adopting
contraceptives to prevent possible procreative consequences of foreseen
rape, for the raped person does not choose to engage in sexual intercourse
or to prevent a possible consequence of its own sexual behavior. Thus ,
what I have called the "ethical context" is completely different. IS It does,
however, apply to forced sexual intercourse between spouses, because
marriage involves commitment to engage in the conjugal act.
By adopting this description, we will be able to point out that the reason
why contraception is wrong is not because it violates naturally given
structures of the generative faculty or other "natural" la ws, for not every
act of preventing conception implies such violations or inferences with
natural processes , while others (such as taking an ovulation-inhibiting pill
in fear of rape), which actually do imply it, are not covered by this
description.
I shall develop my argument in the following steps:
I. A previous exposition of the anthropological meaning of the
Inseparability Principles. This will lead to the definition of the object of
sexual intercourse. This is the cornerstone of my argument.
2. A clarification of what "procreative responsibility", as derived from
the Inseparability Principle, means within the context of an ethical theory
which is based on the concept of moral virtue. This step renders
anthropological insights applicable to concrete human actions.
3. The analysis of the difference between contraceptive intercourse and
intercourse in the context of a practice of periodic abstinence as two
radically different forms of sexual behavior, containing the proof of the
objective disconnection of the two meanings of the conjugal act as
resulting from contraception. This piece of action analysis forms the very
core of my argument.
4. The exposition of some intrinsic implications of contraception,
mainly disintegration of sexuality and its consequences for marital love.
This shows the gravity of the moral disorder implied in contraception.
5. Finally, I shall point out why, by this argument , contraception has
been shown to violate naturallaw.
I would like to draw attention to the importance of the methodological
order implied in the following way of proceeding. Equally, I wish to stress
that I shall not derive an argument against contraception from the
Inseparability Principle , but rather prove the very truth of this principle on
the level of single performances of actions . The anthropology implied in
the Inseparability Principle is nothing but the starting point of the
argument and its cornerstone. The proper core of this argument, however,
will be contained in the third step: the analysis of the morally relevant
difference between periodic continence and contraceptive behavior.
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Do allow me just one supplementary remark . I shall not be talking
about "Natural Family Planning" (NFP). Besides other reasons, mainly
because "natural" is a rather misleading term in this context, insinuating,
though incidentally, a difference with "artificial". Instead of NFP, I will
only talk about "periodic continence" and "procreative responsibility". On
the other hand , periodic continence does not necessarily mean a
"planning" of the family , but only for serious reasons of responsibility , the
avoiding of offspring in determinate circumstances.
II.

1. The meaning of the Inseparability Principle, or the "object" of the
marital act.

Like all basic principles, the Inseparability Principle has to be "shown"
rather than demonstrated. It is an anthropological principle expressing the
fundamental unity of human persons as compound beings of body and
spirit. In his consciousness, the acting person spontaneously possesses at
least implicit awareness of this complex unity. A human person
experiences its body and the body's acts as "his / her" body and "his / her"
acts which belong to one's personal "self'. Metaphysical anthropology
will, in a systematical way, elucidate this experience, coming to the
following results:
Man is essentially a bodily being and, as such a bodily being, he belongs
to the genus of animals . At the same time, man is spirit as well. He is, as
Aristotle says, an organized organic body animated by a spiritual soul;
according to the terminology of the scholastics, he is animal rationale. The
spiritual soul is the substantial form of a body which therefore is a
substantial unity. Consequently, man's corporeality is fully integrated into
the structure of spiritual life. It is "informed" by spiritual life , becoming
however itself the subject or "carrier" of spiritual acts.
So the acting human subject is always a body-spirit-unity. Human acts
are not either spiritual or bodily acts nor are they acts of a spiritual
substance that makes use of the body as its "instrument". Human acts are
always, although in different ways, acts of body and spirit cooperating.
Human acts therefore are, even in the case of properly inner acts of
intelligence and will , always acts of a body, though of a spiritually
informed body. Likewise human acts, even in the case of proper bodily
acts, are always acts of a spirit, although of a bodily bound spirit, that is of
a spirit which, by its own nature, is the substantial form of a body. Thus
there is only one "suppositum" (real, existing individual thing), whose
nature (or "essence") includes body and spirit and which we used to call the
human person; (this entirely differs with the christological - hypostaticalunion of two natures in one person. Man, therefore, is not an "incarnated
spirit".)
This full integration of the body and its acts into the life of the spirit
entails also the integration of the body into the structure of spiritual love,

32

Linacre Quarterly

· which is based.on free willand Iati.olla Ii.ty. (it.is dilectio) and whose properact is free self-giving.
Because of this fundamental substantial unity of body and spirit , human
love is not only a spiritual reality, but also a corporal one (which also is
valid for the love of God) . The spirit also talks the "language of the body",
and it is a language proper to it because the spirit is by its very nature the
substantial form (the soul) of the body. The body has to be considered as
"subject", and not as "object" or "means" of spiritual love: The human
body fully belongs to the subjectivity of the acting person.
On the other hand, there is a simple fact based upon the bodily
constitution of man : Propagation of the human species takes place
through bodily acts of procreatian. Human procreation , therefare, is a
basic human good (and nat .only a gaad an the physialagical level in the
sense of a mere "natural" autcame .of a bialagical pracess). Pracreatian·is a
basic human goad in the same extent as human life generally is , far the
autcame .of the procreative pracess is nat simply a "living bady", but a
living human person. Mareaver, because .of the substantial unity .of man ,
this act .of pracreatian cannat be discannected fram the spiritual
dimensian .of the saul: the carporal act of procreatian necessarily acquires
a spiritual dimension; the act .of human pracreatian is essentially a
spiritual act as well. Being integrated in human nature , it is alsa spiritual
lave. It is dilectio and therefare marked by the seal .of free mutual selfgiving .of two human persans. Otherwise we wauld encaunter a deep
dichatamy within the structure .of the persan, a principle .of disintegratian
.of its unity. We wauld have ta subscribe ta a kind .of dualistic
anthrapalagy.16 Thus "Humanae Vitae" in Na. 10, rightly paints aut that
the bialagicalla ws .of the generative faculty are nat .only a "biolagical" fact
with which man meets while experiencing his badily drives, but alsa they
are human goods belonging to the human personality. part .of man's
persanal subjectivity (which explains the sametimes misunderstoad
reference ta "Summa Thealagiae", I-II, 94,2).1 7
Far the same reason , this spiritual act (love between male and female
and its expression in the "language .of the bady") is baund ta the canditians
.of the bady itself, because , as we have seen, the bady is subject. "carrier" .of
spiritual acts. In every act .of pracreatian, spirit and bady are thus mutually
correlated and cooperating; they are - strictly analagaus ta the matterfarm campasitian an the antalagicallevel - cooperating principles in the
act itself; they are twa caaperating principles fram which will yield in each
case numerically one single human act. Sa, thraugh the spirit the bady
acquires a new dimensian and thraugh the bady the spirit acquires a new
dimensian as well.
Fram this, several consequences result. In the case .of man , sexual acts
are mare than simple sexual capulatian ta result in pracreatian. They
essentially are acts .of free mutual self-giving .of twa laving persans. On the
other hand , acts .of marital lave which cansist in recipracal self-giving, are
in their bodily dimensian always acts .of "this" bady, and that entails:
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they have a procreative meaning (nobody can den y this, unless rejecting a
constitutive propert y of the body. By emphasizing this fact , however, one
is not asse rting that every act of sexual copulation is, or should be
procreatively effectual).
On the grounds of this analysis , we are now equipped with the elements
required to understand exactly the two meanings of the conjugal act , as
well as the principle of their intrinsic connection.
I. To be fully human, human procreation presupposes spiritual love. It
presupposes the act of mutual self-giving. Human procreation has its place
within the context of spiritual love which is the context of a community of
persons (and not of "i nstinctive steering"). It is informed by the " logic" of
this love in the same degree as the body is informed by spiritual life
altogether. Procreation withdrawn from this context would not be fully
human procreation anymore.,.but rather procreation of another kind ; e.g.,
animal or technical (even ifeffectuated by human beings as, for example,
in vitro fertilization).
2. By the same token, we may affirm: Love between male and female,
insofar as it tends to be consummated in bodily union (that is, insofar as it
springs from the "naturalis inciinatio ad coniunctionem maris et feminae",
from sexual inclination),'b y its very nature possesses a procreative
dimension , because it is love between two bodily constituted spiritual
beings. In other words: the loving bodily union of male and female is , by its
own nature, "service to transmission of life" . Of course there exist different
forms of love between persons as well as different possible forms of love
between human beings of different sexes (e.g., mere fellowship or love
between brother and sister). However, loving attraction between male and
female springing from sexual inclination and therefore tending to bodily
union is, taking into account the body-spirit unity, a kind oflove specified
by the very sexual tendency to bodily union. This implies this love to be
specified by the naturally given condition of the body itself and therefore
to be "procreative love" - love which has a "function", or better, a
mission.
So, "inseparable connection" of the two meanings signifies their
reciprocal inclusive correlation. The bodily reality of procreation receives
its fully human specification from spiritual love, and spiritual love of the
married persons receives its specification as a determinate sort oflove from
the procreative function of the body.
Thus, for a correct and exhaustive understanding of the Inseparability
Principle, it seems to be decisive to recognize that these two meanings are
neither two meanings solely "added" one to the other nor merely two
conjoined or accumulated "functions", each of which has its full
intelligibility independently from the other. Rather, I should say, each one
receives its full intelligibility as a human reality - its full human meaning
- precisely from the other. Procreation considered independently from
spiritual love is not the same thing anymore. And spiritual love tending to
bodily umon between male and female considered apart from its
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procreative meaning is not the same thing anymore either. This precisely is
what follows from man's substantial body-spirit unity.
If we consider things in this perspective of an anthropology which takes
seriously the substantial unity of body and spirit, then the reason why these
two meanings are inseparably connected becomes obvious: by separating
them we would alter both the meaning of human procreation and the
meaning of marital loving union. Both meanings are not extrinsically, but
intrinsically connected. The very connection constitutes the specifically
human content of both meanings.
It may be useful to further stress the point I intended to make offering
the foregoing exposition. "Humanae Vitae" speaks, in No . 12, about the
inseparable connection of two meanings ("significatio"), and not of two
functions of the marital act. Only a fertile sexual act can have a
"procreative function ". An infertile act, however, may have a procreative
meaning, if this act is intentionally open to procreation, though it will
never have a procreative "function". "Procreative function" depends on
actual fertility which, in a determinate moment, may be biologically given
or not. Thus, to speak about "inseparability" of procreative and unitive
"functions" would not make much sense, for only few sexual acts are
"fertile" and actually have a procreative "function".18 Obviously, the
procreative "function" can be entirely suppressed or separated from the
love expressing "function". The Inseparability Principle, as stated by
"Humanae Vitae", does not simply state that one is "not allowed" to do
that, but that one cannot do it without destroying the very meaning of the
marital act. The point is that "Humanae Vitae" speaks about an
anthropological inseparability of the two meanings, which are not two
functions but two aspects of the one and indivisible essence of the marital
act. Therefore, "Humanae Vitae" calls the two meanings also "essential
aspects" or "essential qualities" ("ultraque eius essentialis ratio ', of the
marital act. In reality, both meanings together form one single, but
complex unity of meaning, which is a true expression of man's substantial
and therefore essential unity of body and spirit. 19 Only on these grounds, I
think, is it possible to fully render justice to what "Humanae Vitae" affirms
in No . 11: that every marital act, also those which are infertile and
therefore obviously do not have a procreative "function", must be open to
procreation, and must have a procreative meaning, which is inseparably
connected with the unitive meaning.20 The Inseparability Principle,
therefore, is not simply a re-formulation of a negative precept, but the very
(anthropological) rationale which provides the reason why one cannot
separate one meaning from the other without destroying the whole.
Philosophically spoken, we may conclude therefrom that such a
separation would be contrary to God's will and that, therefore, one may
not realize it.
From the Inseparability Principle derives the identification of the object
of the marital act of sexual intercourse. The object of a human act (which is
an act conceived as proceeding from deliberate will)'is its act-specifying
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content. So called "moral objects" are the objects of the rationally guided
will's choices to do something. Thus , objects of human acts are neither the
naturally given goals of inclinations nor "things" we are acting about or
aiming at , but rather, as Aquinas says, "!ormae a ratione conceptae".21 Or,
using words of a contemporary author, "We must always remember that
an object is not what what is aimed at is; the description under which it is
aimed at is that under which it is called the object."22 Such descriptions
under which actions are chosen are meant to be the intentional contents 0/
these actions; they refer to what one is doing when one does "this" on
purpose.23
As we have seen, the human act of procreation essentially is an act of
loving bodily union. Its unitive meaning is not just "one" meaning and the
openness to procreation "another". It would be nonsense to say that
sometimes spouses perform intercourse to express mutual love · and
sometimes to procreate a new human life, or that sometimes they "do both
things" together. What they deliberately choose (i.e., the description under
which their doing is chosen) is always one and the same: to give themselves
with their whole spiritual, affective, emotional and sexual being to loving
union (which, of course, physically is copulation; but "to copulate" surely
is not the description under which normal couples choose copulation,
hence, it is not to be called the "object of sexual intercourse"). Spouses give
themselves to loving union whether procreation is actually intended or
not. The reason for this is, every act of intercourse - even if the intention to
procreate is the direct and explicit reason for actually engaging in
intercourse - is by its very nature an act of loving union; procreation is
effectuated just by loving mutual self-giving ofthe spouses in the totality of
their body-spirit-unity. So every procreative act is expressing loving union.
If, in the rather extreme case that sexual intercourse were performed
without any mutual affection (exclusively for the sake of "making a baby",
say), the act would be profoundly vitiated. When sexual intercourse, on
the other hand , is performed in knowingly infertile periods , the meanings
of the act are again the same: loving union , mutual self-giving of the
spouses. If by physiological reasons, procreation was not possible and was
even foreseen as such the objective meaning of the spouses' doing would
not be affected by this. The reason is that what they intentionally do (what
they "choose") is to engage in an act of loving bodily union which by its
very nature serves procreation. The act they perform is a generative sort of
act: 24 even if it has not a procreative/unction (because of its being infertile),
it nevertheless maintains its procreative meaning. If this act, for natural
reasons beyond intention, cannot have procreative efficiency, this does not .
alter what one intentionally does (what one chooses) as long as one did not
do (choose) anything for preventing procreation. Human acts are specified
by the object of one's will, and not by facts of nature which fall outside the
reach of human choices. As has been already emphasized above, the two
meanings of the marital act are two inseparable aspects of one object. 25
Consequently, an act of loving union which knowingly is infertile may,
36

Linacre Quarterly

considered as an intentional action, objectively be a procreative act.
Therefore, the "object" of the conjugal act is neither "procreation" nor
"expressing mutual love". We should rather define it as something like
"loving bodily union" or "mutual self-giving in the totality of one's bodilyspiritual being", taking into account, however, that "loving bodily union"
has to be understood as "consummation of marital love", which obviously
includes both the intentional openness to procreation (because of the very
nature of the body as well as of the sexual character of marriage) and
cooperation with God's creative love (because of procreation's involvement
in God's creative love).26 What we have to define well, above all, is marital
love. Then we will be able to rightly understand the object of marital
intercourse as nothing other than the consummation of this love. Thus,
conjugal acts would be altered in their objective meaning - in their very
meaning as acts of "loving union" - just by intentionally excluding their
openness to procreation. 27
What have I shown up to this point? I have shown that intentional
foreclosing of the procreative dimension of loving bodily union alters
objectively the very nature of this union into a kind of "love" which is at
odds with the anthropological truth of man. (It contradicts the substantial
unity of body and spirit). In the context of our case, however, this is not a
sufficient proof for the contention that contraception does in fact involve
such a foreclosing. So, I wish to emphasize this: I have not yet proven that
contraception is wrong.
The reason for this is that our case is based on the presupposition that
avoiding pregnancy is rightly demanded by procreative responsibility; that
spouses ought to avoid conception now. On the grounds of this
supposition, someone could rightly ask why, in order to meet this
requirement while maintaining fully the procreative meaning of marital
love in its totality, one should not be allowed to uncouple sexuality's
procreative efficiency from its unitive function at least on the level ofsingle
performances of marital acts (i.e.,"sometimes", "occasionally" or
"temporarily"). Contraceptive intercourse, then, would be supposed to
receive its procreative meaning from the overall intention with which
marital life is lived in its totality. "Why not", one could ask, "adopt
contraception, given that we are bound to avoid pregnancy just for reasons
of procreative responsibility?" "Why should the suppression of the
procreative function of single sexual acts necessarily suppress also their
procreative meaning, provided that contraception is chosen on the
grounds of the very intention of responsibly serving the transmission of
life?" "Why is this unity required to be maintained also on the level of
single performances of conjugal acts?" And finally, "Why is only periodic
continence, which means abstaining from those acts which are foreseen to
have procreative consequences, the only upright behavior in order to live
procreative responsibility under given circumstances? Is this claim not a
piece of subtle hair-splitting; is this not mere sophistry, the only point of
which could be seen in the rather abstract demand of respecting the
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biological patterns inherent in human nature, a demand which, in the
given situation, can hardly be made intelligible as a moral exigency?"
Such questions actually show that appealing to the Inseparability
Principle alone does not yet resolve the problem of contraception. We
need a further argument to substantiate that contraception indeed does
violate this principle in any case. That is, we need an argument which may
elucidate that the Inseparability Principle is valid on the level of single
performance ofactions as well. So, some more action analysis is required. I
shall have to show why contraception and periodic abstinence are two very
different kinds of human behavior and why the former is not compatible
with procreative responsibility while the latter is . This is equivalent to
showing that contraception is incompatible with the objective meaning of
single performances of the conjugal act, unless by doing this it could not be
proven that the Inseparability Principle is a principle valid as well for
judging each single performance of the conjugal act. To reject
contraception on its grounds, it necessarily is required to be pointed out as
such a principle, because otherwise resorting to it would simply be
question-begging.
For this purpose I will first have to say a few words about "procreative
responsiblity". I wish to emphasize that only at this point are we entering
into the proper perspective of natural law and at the same time into the
perspective of moral virtue.
2. 'Procreative Responsibility'
Procreation in the realm of animals is steered by instinctive drives .
According to the famous dictum of the Roman lawyer, Ulpian, "the
natural inclination to the conjunction of male and female" is something
"that nature has taught all animals", including man. Yet, with St. Thomas
Aquinas , we have to add that nature did not teach all animals to follow this
inclination under the guidance of reason and will , that is, to pursue it
responsibly.28 Non-rational animals follow their instincts, and so they
fulfill the will ofthe Creator. But man, the "rational animal", can fulfill this
will only as a responsible agent, as the master of his own actions, as an
"interpreter of God's will" , participating in the Creator's providence by his
own acts of intelligent understanding. Exactly this active, intelligent
participation in divine providence is what properly is called natural law.
Man has to judge what is right or what is convenient to do. By simply
following his instincts, he could not fulfill the will of his Creator.
In the encyclical "Humanae Vitae", the following is said about
"procreative responsibility" or "responsible parenthood" (No . 10):
- one must know and observe the specific functions of the biological
processes involved in procreation and that they belong to the human
personality;
- one must exert dominion by reason and will over one's "innate drives
and emotions";
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- one has to judge responsibly one's own physical , economic,
psychological and social conditions for being able to decide about either
enlarging the family or renouncing having any more children for the time
being or even for an indeterminate period.
- spouses ought to integrate the means into the right moral order and to
carry out their duties towards God , themselves , their family and human
society.
This description of what responsible parenthood is , also provides a very
precise characterization of the virtue of chastity. Chastity does not simply
mean continence, but mastery of one's own sexual drives so as to integrate
them into the order of personal love . That is why according to Thomas
Aquinas, chastity does not contradict what he calls an only "apparent
incontinence" proceeding from "good concupiscence which is according to
reason" J9 Indeed, normally sexual intercourse is elicited by spontaneD us
sensual desire. That conjugal acts be "according to reason" does not
require engagement in them on the grounds of rational deliberation
(aiming at procreation or at rendering the marriage debt). This would be
quite an unrealistic view. Fortunately, we need not subscribe to Benjamin
Franklin's grimly utilitarian and puritan view, "Rarely use venery but for
health and offspring". Conjugal love has its own spontaneity which yields
from sexual inclination and the drives proper to it (which is quite different
from "acting purely for pleasure"). What is required is habitual or virtual
integration of this desire into the order of reason which is the order of
human love.
Besides the very important and often withheld fact that responsible
parenthood may also lead the spouses to decide to enlarge their family,
procreative responsibility basically means the morally upright and
virtuous integration of sexual drives into the dominion of reason and will.
It means following sexual inclination reasonably and, therefore,
responsibly performing sexual acts as human acts guided by reasoninformed will. Thus, procreative responsibility means sexual behavior
fully integrated in the requirements of spiritual life, a specific kind of
virtuous self-control. .
Procreative responsibility as part of the virtue of chastity is not
compatible with any kind of such an integration. Being a virtue, it includes
a kind of integration which corresponds to the anthropological truth of
man as a body-spirit unity. The body and its sexual drives are not "nature"
in the sense of nature which "surrounds" us, or which we are "living in" and
"acting on". The body's sexual drives do not belong to such an objectworld of nature, but to nature which constitutes our own substantial being
and , therefore, belongs to our own subjectivity. We are not spirits simply
"placed in the environment of a body". We do not "have" a body, but we
are bodies. Sexual drives of the body are called to be informed by spiritual
life and , on the other hand, to be themselves subject of this spiritual life.
This means: Acts of procreative responsibility do not consist in any kind of
rationally and voluntarily "controlling", "guiding" or even "suppressing"
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sexual drives. Sexuality is not a mere object of procreative responsibility,
but must become its subject. Man's substantial unity requires that sexual
behavior, the sexual acts themselves, be informed by the requirements of
responsibility.
This is what generally applies to the moral virtue of temperance to which
chastity belongs. The virtue of temperance means tempering, modifying
the very sensual appetites according to reason, neither "suppressing" them
nor rendering them "harmless", but "impressing in them the seal of
reason"30 and its requirements, so as to enable sensual appetites themselves
to pursue what is according to reason, that is to say, according to
responsibility.3) Moral virtue never consists in acts of repelling or
suppressing sensual inclinations and their proper goods or goals. Such acts
can be necessary as a part of the inner struggle by which a virtue is acquired
or its possession preserved, but to conceive virtue itself in this way would
be a rather spiritualistic conception of its nature, and therefore imply
anthropological dualism . Acts of temperance thus and, consequently, of
chastity and procreative responsibility will always be acts whose subject is
the sensual appetite itself, modified in accordance with reason . They will
be acts of sexual behavior, and this means acts in which not only is reason
engaged in responsibility, but the whole human person, including its
bodily dimension, is striving for those goods which, according to dictates
of practical reason, the will pursues . Thus, they will be acts in which the
body has the function of a principle of actions.
The elaboration of this concept of procreative responsibility as an
integral part of the virtue of chastity is the pivotal move towards a
differentiation of contraceptive sexual behavior and sexual behavior in the
context of periodic continence. This concept of procreative responsibility
corresponds fully to the Inseparability Principle, but it enables us to bring
this principle down to the level ofsingle performances ofsexual acts, to the
le vel of concrete sexual behavior. Once we have understood sexual
behavior as a subject and therefore an operative principle of procreative
responsibility, and once we have made out that "openness to procreation",
as a part of the objective content of the conjugal act, means "procreative
responsibility", then we have settled the validity of the Inseparability
Principle, not only on the level of the guiding intentions underlying marital
love in its totality, but also on the level of single bodily unions in the
conjugal act. For virtues are shaped by and aim at concrete performances
of acts and their corresponding choices, and single acts and their
corresponding choices are morally specified by their intentional contents
which spring from the virtues to which they belong. This will become
clearer when we proceed in the argument, analyzing now the difference
between contraceptive intercourse and intercourse in the context of
periodic continence precise~)i as two different kinds of sexual behavior.
With this, we are arriving at the core of the argument.
3. Contraceptive Sexual Behavior and Periodic Continence
Therefore, only this third step contains the proper argument against
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contraception. To detect the wrongness of the contraceptive choice, we
have to start, however, with considering the practice of periodic
continence. This, I think, is a necessary methodological requirement. In
themselves , "failures" or evils of any kind have no intelligibility, for they
have a privative character. Moralfailures, evils or vices are intelligible only
through the light of the goods or virtues they oppose.32 So we have to
consider first what spouses really do (and, therefore, choose) when they are
responsibly practicing periodic continence.
Spouses adopt the practice of periodic continence guided by a reason to
avoid pregnancy which will induce them to refrain from sexual intercourse
at times. They know that there are some periods in which intercourse is
likely to lead to pregnancy, and others in which it is not. They are able
(possibly with the help of an appropriate "method") to discern when the
one or the other thing will be the case. But they know as well that the
conjugal act is perfectly licit even if it is performed only for the reason of
expressing mutual love. They will therefore abstain from intercourse
during knowingly fertile periods and they will have intercourse only in
periods which are foreseen to be infertile. Notice: the "method" (if ever
adopted) in itself does not serve to avoid conception, nor does it prevent it.
The "method" only provides some knowledge about fertility rhythms.
What regulates conception is the act of abstaining from knowingly fertile
intercourse. "Natural methods", independent from acts of continence, do
not regulate anything. Thus , to speak comparatively about so-called
"natural methods" and "artificial (contraceptive) methods" is entirely
misleading. They are both "methods", but with an entirely different
immediate aim, function, and outcome. In the case of "natural methods",
the "method" itself is not essential; it only helps periodic continence to
attain its purpose. In the case of contraception, as we will see, the
"method" is just the "whole"; it is what essentially and sufficiently regulates
conception by simply rendering sexual acts infertile.
It is important to emphasize that in the given description of periodic
continence not only one, but two different, although closely correlated
actions of "sexual behavior" are included: both the performance of
engaging in intercourse and the performance of continence (the act of
refraining from intercourse) are authentic acts of sexual behavior.
Moreover, the act of refraining is an action proceeding from a common
decision of the spouses; both are engaged in abstaining from an action
which is foreseen to effect conception. They realize their intention to avoid
this by avoiding the performance ofthe act which would lead to it. This act
of avoiding is a bodily act of procreative responsibility. It is not simply an
"omission" in the sense of "not doing something", something purely
"negative"; rather it is a determinate kind of action , that is to say, a
deliberate human act of sexual behavior.
Moreover, this act of refraining from intercourse is a real conjugal act.
In it the two meanings of marital love are present. It is an act with a fully
procreative meaning, because it is performed for reasons of procreative
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responsibility. It actually is, by its very intentional content and thus
objectively, an act of procreative responsibility. By abstaining from
possibly fertile intercourse, spouses relate to sexual acts, to themselves and
to each other, as a possible cause of new life. The respecting of their sexual
activity as such a cause - and provided that they feel obliged not to beget a
baby - precisely is the reason why they abstain from intercourse.
Behaving alike, the spouses moreover act as two persons "united in one
flesh" : their behavior proceeds from procreatively responsible continence
have a proper marital and even parental meaning. They are acts of bodily
constituted loving persons engaged in responsibly arising to the exigencies
of their marital and parental vocation. In another way than intercourse
itself, acts ofresponsibly abstainingfrom it are true expressions ofboth the
procreative and the unitive meaning ofsexuality, inseparably connected. 33
The problems, burdens and difficulties possibly involved in a practice of
periodic continence, to which its critics so often refer, have to be
considered as the burdens and difficulties involved in faithfully carrying
out marital commitment and not - as critics usually do - as something
interfering with marital love. These burdens and difficulties may be
overcome precisely by the fact that continence is an act of marital love in
itself. The very nature of responsible abstinence includes the dynamic
principle for overcoming these difficulties: this principle is just "marital
love". By responsibly abstaining from intercourse, spouses only abstain
from a determinate kind of bodily expression of mutual love; but they
obviously do not abstain thereby from marital love and reciprocal selfgiving altogether. The common task of overcoming possible difficulties
involved in practicing periodic continence will be a proper content and a
fruitful touchstone of marital love. Within the context of the "logic"
proper to periodic continence, what may seem a burden changes into a
source of maturing in love and increasing mutual self-giving. Only on the
background of an already deeply implanted contraceptive mentality,
periodic continence may appear unreasonable .
Sexual intercourse actually is not the only way of expressing marital
love and it is not the only way of mutual self-giving; acts of continence will
also share in this function if they are informed by responsible love. This is
what is commonly overlooked. Equally often, one overlooks that sexual
desire is not frustrated or spoiled by the fact of not actually being satisfied;
just the contrary is the case. Responsibly abstaining from sexual
intercourse does not involve forcing oneself to "stoic insensibility",
shelving sexuality from marital life or even denying it. By the very act of
responsibly refraining from its actual satisfaction, sexual desire is both
affirmed and integrated into the "logic" of personal love. Thus it is
affirmed as a human good to be pursued responsibly.
On the other hand, sexual intercourse performed in this context of
periodic abstinence during knowingly infertile periods is not only an act of
loving union, but also an act which fully conserves its procreative meaning,
because it is intentionally, and therefore "objectively", embedded in the
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structure of procreative responsibility. The point I wish to make here is
that these spouses live this responsibility by the means of their bodily
love, by sexual behavior, modifying this behavior for reasons of
responsibility. So sexuality, including its procreative dimension, is fully
integrated into procreatively responsible behavior, into the life of the
spirit. This operative integration is nothing other than the virtue of chastity
as described above (see section II, 2).
It seems , therefore, that chastity is bound to the condition of sexual
intercourse never intentionally prevented from bearing procreative
consequences; this, as it seems, is just what "Humanae Vitae" calls the "per
se-openness to procreation". But notice: This is only a previous condition
and not the rationale of the virtue of chastity. It is a condition made out as
a condition just through providing a further argument which finally
reveals its being a condition.
Let me now consider contraceptive behavior. Contraception signifies
that to avoid conception , sexual behavior need not be modified. Of course
something in the behavior must be modified. There is required a certain
discipline, from one of the spouses at least, in taking the pill, say, according
to medical prescriptions (but this is incidental, as the case of sterilization
and IUDs shows). In any event, sexuality, the sensual appetite or drive
precisely, need not be modified (which , of course, is equally the point of
onanistic orgasm achieved by "coitus interruptus").
Thus, while the former couple, by performing the bodily act of
responsible continence, chose to avoid those acts which were foreseen to
have procreative consequences, contraception signifies to choose an act
which impedes possible procreative consequences of sexual intercourse.
Thus on the level of performed sexual acts, spouses do not modify anything.
-What they do is prevent these acts from being fertile so as to render
needless responsible modification of sexual behavior. Unlike continence,
this act of preventing sexual behavior from possibly procreative
consequences is not in itself a sexual act; it is exclusively a "method" which
only relates to sexual acts by preventing their procreative consequences.
This clearly shows that the contraceptive act is not problematic because of
its "unnatural" character (in the sense of "artificially" obstructing the
natural process of ovulation or fecundation, which, as is obvious, does not
happen in the case of "coitus interruptus"). Contraception is problematic
precisely because of the fact that it renders needless a specific sexual
behavior informed by procreative responsibility; it also involves a choice
against virtuous self-control by continence. The act of procreative
responsibility, in this case, is a pure act of deliberate will which treats
sexuality and the body as its object (equal to a diseased liver, heart or
digestive apparatus) . Consequently, sexual behavior itself is withdrawn
from being informed by responsibility with regard to its being a cause of
new life; in addition it is withdra wn from its being called to be subject and
principle of this act of responsibility. Procreative responsibility of the
sexual act itself is eliminated and denied. Sexual acts are impeded from
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being a ca use of new life and the acting person is no longer acting as such a
cause. Mostly in the case of sterilization, there is no need anymore of even
thinking about procreative responsibility. The procreative dimension of
marital love is entirely "off'. It remains the claim of thereby expressing
marital love , but this love has altered its meaning by the very exclusion of
its procreative meaning. So, the connection of the two meanings of marital
intercourse has objectively been broken precisely on the level of
intentional actions, on the level of the concrete sexual behavior one has
deliberately chosen , and that is , on the level of single acts of contraceptive
intercourse.
Let me sum up. Contraception renders sexual acts to be acts without any
procreative consequences. Acts whose foreseen procreative consequences
have intentionally been prevented cannot be anymore procreatively
responsible acts ;34just for reasons of procreative responsibilty, they do not
require anymore to be dominated by reason and will, which are the
principles of human acts. So, sexual acts loose objectively their character
of human acts of the species "procreative responsibility", while acts of
periodic continence and of intercourse in this context fully maintain this
character.
Thus, insofar as the contraceptive choice involves intentionally rejecting
procreative responsibility for one's sexual behavior, it also involves an
anti-procreative volition. But it is specifically a peculiarity of man that he
should integrate his sexual inclination and the acts deriving from it into the
structures of responsibility and, thereby, into the life of the spirit.
Contraception thus destroys the proper way in which human sexuality is
meant to be a part of responsible human behavior. Instead of rising to the
requirement of responsibility caring about what essentially is a cause of
transmitting new life, spouses who contracept adopt a device which
withdraws their sexual acts from being such a cause , with regard to the
consequences of which responsible behavior is required . This is a
fundamental attack on both the integrity of the human person as a
body-spirit unity and on marital love which expresses this unity.
Contraceptive intercourse is not an expression of marital love. In itself
(disregarding the marital context), its point is nothing differs from the
point of any other form of sexual activity, as mutual masturbation or
sodomy. "It can't be the mere pattern of bodily behaviour in which the
stimulation is procured that makes all the difference! But if such things are
all right , it becomes perfectly impossible to see anything wrong with
homosexual intercourse, for example. (... ) you will have no solid reason
against these things".35
What I have shown up to this point is that the contraceptive choice
properly excludes a basic disposition of modifying one's sexual behavior
for reasons of procreative responsibility. Thus, contraceptive intercourse
is an act withdrawn from the logic of the procreative task ; intentionally it is
not "open" anymore to procreation (and this means: objectively it is no
longer open) while this is not the case in acts of periodic continence nor in
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sexual intercourse performed in its context. Consequently both kinds of
behavior have a very different intentional structure as far as procreation is
concerned. Contraception indeed is contralife in the sense that it involves
the negation of sexual behavior as a part of responsibility in regard to the
task of transmitting human life.
This may be less obvious in the very special, but theoretically possible
case in which contraception is chosen exclusively for reasons of adopting a
safer way of avoiding pregnancy. Nevertheless, in this case also one would
choose against continence, though not with the intention of avoiding the
possible "burden" of continence, but for the reason of aiming at security.
But objectively, on the level of the sexual behavior in which one chooses to
engage, continence, and thus responsible modification of sexual behavior,
are equally excluded. In any event, this would not be the right way of
making a choice; good (further) intentions do not justify wrong means.
Whether an action which in itself actually does have a proper moral
content and relevance (which therefore is not indifferens ex specie) is a
good means for carrying out a determinate purpose, has to be settled
independently from intentions however good and justified they may be.
This view seems to be confirmed by what the II Vatican Council's
Pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et spes" has established as a basic moral
criterion for responsible parenthood:
.. . when there is a question of harmonizing conjugal love with the responsible
transmission of life, the moral aspect of any procedure does not depend solely on
sincere intentions or on an evaluation of motives. It must be determined by
objective standards. These, based on the nature of the human person and his or
her acts. preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human procreation in
the context of true love. Such a goal cannot be achieved unless the virtue of
conjugal chastity is sincerely practiced (No . 51).

N ow we can recognize the importance of an often overlooked passage in
"Humanae Vitae" in the final paragraph of its No. 16: Periodic abstinence
and contraception, the encyclical affirms, are two radically different kinds
of behavior. At a first glance, the substantiating of this claim looks rather
deceiving and odd: "In the former, married couples rightly use a facility
provided them by nature. In the latter they obstruct the natural
development of the generative process."
Again, it seems that the reason given for the wrongness of contraception
is its unnatural character, its lack of respect for naturally given patterns.
However, according to the encyclical's wording this is not yet a moral
judgment, but only the description of the action about which a moral
judgment has to be given . The rationale for this moral judgment (and
therefore the rationale of the intentional content of the described action) is
provided only in the following sentence: The reason why it is licit to restrict
oneself to performing intercourse only during infertile periods, the
encyclical says, is that in this case, during fertile periods, spouses perform
acts of abstaining from intercourse. Let us cite the text (the emphasis is
mine):
May, 1989

45

It cannot be d enied that in each case marri ed co uples . for acce pta ble reaso ns. are
both perfectly clea r in their intention to avo id children and mean to ma ke sure
that none will be bo rn . But it is equa lly true Ih al il is exclusivelr in Ihe(o rmer case
Ihal husband and '\'lIe are ready 10 ahslain (,se .. .abslinere valeam') from
imercourse during Iheferrile period as ofte n as for reaso na ble mot ives the birth of
another child is no t desirable .

This " readiness to a bstain from intercourse" is equal to at least an implicit
choice of modifying one's sex ual behavio r for reasons of procreative
responsibilty; it refers to a fundamental and decisive disposition. So
"Humanae Vitae" see ms to ass ume the following: For disco ve ring what is
wrong with contraception, one must not concentrate on questions like:
' What's wrong with obstructing the procreative process in having its
natural course?' The question which has to be a sked rather is: "What is
wrong with procreative responsibility carried out by rendering modification of one's sexual behavior needless and even useless?" Or, put in
another way, "What is wrong with a choice for avoiding pregnancy which
excludes the choice of modifying one's bodily behavior?" For that,
precisely, is the point of contraception. In the light of this sort of questions
only , the attempt to interfere with natural processes by preventing
conception manifests itself as a moral problem . Unless one realizes that
contraception opposes the requirements of virtuously carrying out
procreative responsibility, one will not be able to substantia te why the act
of preventing conception implies moral fault.
This moral fault then consists in withdrawing the body from the context
of responsibility, treating it as a mere "object to be regulated" instead of
re ~ pecting it as part of the "regulating acting subject", that is, as a principle
of humari acts. With this , the inner truth of the human person as a
substantial unity of body and spirit and the body-spirit-unity of marital
love are, in their very integrity, attacked by a specific sort of behavior, by
concrete performances of single acts: Contraceptive intercourse regarded
as an intentional action is another sort of sexual act than sexual
intercou.lse in the context of periodic continence.
As I have shown, this intent to withdraw sexuality from the context of
procreative responsibility is equal with acting against the virtue of chastity
which implies virtuous self-control. This, as it seems to me, is the leading
perspective underlying the teaching of "Humanae Vitae," already
announced in the final paragraph of No.2 and finally settled in No. 21 . It is
the perspective present also in John Paul II's allocutions about " Humanae
Vitae" (see his Wednesday audiences from May to November, 1984).

4. Intrinsic implications of contraception: Disintegration of sexuality and
of marital love
The way of arguing adopted so far to substantiate this claim may be
considered as rather abstract and complicated . But, I think , once its
leading insight has been grasped , it turns out to be very plain. Moreover, it
has a strong intuitive appeal. If one explains to contracepting people what
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they are doing when they contracept, just by making them aware of what
they would do instead if they practiced periodic continence, then they are
enabled to immediately grasp what they are failing to do by adopting
contraception. To give evidence concerning vices, one has to talk about
virtues . Intuitive awareness of many people that something is wrong with
contraception (or even their often unconsciously feeling ashamed about
their behavior), is based on the "silent presence" of the demands of natural
law in human conscience , whose voice, of course, may be silenced in some
degree. This demand of natural law present in human conscience is
precisely the insight into the requirements of the virtue of chastity,
connected with the consciousness of one's dignity as a bodily constituted
person.
There are some other aspects deriving from this analysis, which will
finally show what really is at stake and how profound is the moral disorder
involved in contraception. As we have seen, the act of abstaining from
intercourse within periodic continence is an act common to both spouses
who are united as two persons in one flesh and live a common vocation in
serving responsibly the transmission of human life. Yet, a contracepting
couple also undermines this kind of communion. Contraception does not
need common agreement and very often it is adopted against the will of
one of the spouses. Theoretically this could happen also with periodic
continence. But even if contracepting spouses do agree, this agreement has
no bodily expression; sexual behavior remains untouched from this
common policy. Once contraception is chosen, the care for procreative
responsibility informs bodily behavior no longer. It need no longer be a
content offurther dialogue and common decisions as long as contraceptiYe
behavior is not abandoned. It vanishes from conjugal life, the bodily
dimension of which comes to be concentrated in sex as a means for
expressing "love" deprived from its procreative meaning.
This may engender very different consequences, and which of them will
be brought about and in what degree they may occur depends on
contingent factors extrinsic to contraception itself. In any event" with the
adoption of contraception, something objectively decisive has changed .
There is now a principle of disintegration of marital love at work. This
principle of disintegration consists of the peculiarity of sensual appetite
which by its own nature is directed only to actual satisfaction and selfgratification. The "logic" of spiritual love and the "logic" of sensual
appetite are very different; sexuality needs to be operati',ely integrated into
the "logic of the spirit"; only then does it become a specific human and
bodily expression of spiritual love, and only then will it promote
community of persons. 36 Disintegration of sexuality, however, brought
about by contraception, introduces in marital love a kind of "sensual
heteronomy": Besides its self-gratifying character, sensual appetite in itself
has no continuance in time; it tends to decrease in the same measure as it is
gratified. Thus, however, if a beloved person is only an object of sexual
desire, then it is experienced as worthless in the same measure as sexual
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desire is satisfied. Moreover, on its own sensual pleasure does not establish
communion, but rather isolation and loneliness. For it is not selftranscendent to another person , but rather self-centered. By his subjective
experience of sensual pleasure alone, the person is not able to distinguish
this experience from real personal love, the expression of which it should
be. Sensual appetite, moreover, can never strive for the "good of the
other", but only for "its own good"; it is , by its own nature, not able to
increase "love of friendship". So, disintegrated ( or isolated) sexuality is not
a principle of union of two persons. To say it in a clearer way, it tends to
create a fictitious union by transforming spouses into accomplices of
common masturbation . This fictitious character of contraceptive
intercourse is not basically different from the one implied in onanism by
"coitus interruptus". And even if the immediate context is different, it has a
striking similarity with solitary sexY
.
What is lacking is precisely "the task" or "mission" of sexuality which is
able to work as a principle of transcending and "elevating" mere sensuality.
integrating it in the life of the spirit. 38 There exists a problematic gap
between spiritual love as mutual self-giving of two persons to each other
and the claim to express and to nourish this love by acts of sexual pleasure
and satisfaction, which by their own nature tend only to self-gratification.
This satisfaction and this pleasure involved in bodily love are very good
and entirely human things . But they need to be integrated into the
structure of spiritual love and this is hardly possible without the link of a
principle of spiritual love able to inform sexuality itself, giving it a meaning
within the context of spiritual love, a direction towards the "logic of the
spirit" by integrating it into the "conjugal good" (Finnis). Such a principle
should belong to both , spiritual love and sexuality.)t is precisely the link
established by the procreative task , whose requirements also inform acts of
responsibly refraining from intercourse , but not contraceptive conjugal
acts .
The conclusion seems obvious. Sexuality and its pleasure, uncoupled
from their procreative meaning, are no longer able to serve for the
expression of mutual, self-giving love between man and woman.
Disintegrated sexuality is something like a "time bomb"; it acquires a
destructive force and operates like a principle of corrosion of true love .
There exists much clinically observed empirical evidence on this provided
by psychopathology. So we ha ve to defend the procreative meaning of
sexual intercourse precisely in order to defend its unitive meaning. And we
may state again: Both meanings are inseparably connected and
reciprocally related to each other.
I believe that by this way of arguing one can easily understand the still
important difference between couples who illicitly exclude the procreative
good of marriage, one by adopting contraception and the other by
practicing (though illicitly) periodic abstinence. The difference is that in
the latter case the procreative dimension of sexual acts continues to be a
principle which informs bodily behavior, so there is less peril of sexuality's
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disintegration. Sexual acts are related to as something that is a possible
cause of new life and therefore has to be responsibly performed . Thus,
spouses still are aware that they have to account for the possible
procreative consequences of their sexual acts. Therefore, even if they
practice periodic continence illicitly, they precisely do not do this with a
"contraceptive mentality". Obviously, a fortiori this applies to a couple
who , rightly and withjust reasons, practice periodic continence. If, against
their intention to avoid having a baby , conception nevertheless occurs,
then the child will not be an "unwanted child" in the proper sense. More or
less, but surely in some way, they will feel responsible for this new life
which comes into being. At least they willfeel obliged to accept it. because
they know that it is the consequence oftheir being a possible cause of new
life and therefore of what they did or failed to abstain from . Contracepting
spouses, on the other hand, whose policy fails (which may happen), will
not feel responsible for the new life they have begotten, because they have
chosen a line of action which intentionally excludes their being a possible
cause of new life and therefore equally excludes their having to accountfor
the procreative consequences of one's sexual acts. The new human life
coming to be is frustrating their very choice of adopting contraception.
This contraceptive mentality, which is truly contra-life, is what generates
the so called abortion mentality. Where contraceptive behavior spreads,
the number of abortions increases. What makes this mentality so
destructively aggressive is precisely the fact that it proceeds from a mental
attitude which intentionally excludes the responsibility for the procreative
consequences of one's sexual behavior. For this very reason it may be
called a contra-life attitude. 39
Please note that this applies equally to extra-marital sexual intercourse
or fornication. Couples who are not married have a very strong reason for
avoiding the procreative consequences of their mutual love. This reason is
to not cause the initiation of new life outside marriage, which would be the
most irresponsible thing of all. Thus, as far as contraception is concerned,
the same principles apply to them. But periodic continence is excluded as
well, since the unitive meaning of sexual intercourse is fulfilled only within
the context of marital commitment. Marital commitment is nothing but
the very truth of sexuality itself, and sexual intercourse is the
consummation of this marital love. Thus, mutual love of a couple not yet
united in marital commitment cannot be adequately expressed in sexual
intercourse. Therefore, outside of marriage, chastity requires absolute
continence.
5. Contraception and Natural Law

,~

To sum up: Contraception is wrong because it involves a type of sexual
behavior which is inconsistent with procreative responsibility. This
inconsistency is due to the fact that contraceptive sexual behavior destroys
the behavioral unity of body and spirit. Destruction of this unity implies
both to withdraw sexuality from its procreative meaning and to therefore
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di sintegrate sex ua lit y so that it cannot be any lo nger a true expression of
perso nal love . Thus , contraceptive behavior includes features specific to
o ther form s of disintegrated sexuality like onanism and masturbation .
Being similar to these forms of sexual self-gratification, contraceptive
intercourse is not mutual self-giving of the persons, but rather a principle
which undermines the communion of perso ns. Insofar as it is practiced
within marriage , contraceptive behavior additionally opposes the union of
two persons in one flesh committed to responsibl y serving the transmission
of human life .
What I have exposed is a Natural-Law argument against contraception.
It consisted , first, in an anthropological anaiJ'sis olfhe subsfantial unify of
man as a compound being of body and spirit which shows the meaning of
the Inseparability Principle . Second, on these grounds I have elucidated
"procreative responsibility" as a moral I'irrue which enabled us to apply
the Inseparability Principle to concrete performances of actions. Third , I
have analyzed contracepfive beha vior as essentially different from
periodic continence and as being opposed to moral virtue in general, and
to procreative responsibility in particular, proving thereby that
contraceptive intercourse indeed is incompatible with the Inseparability
Principle and therefore with the "truth about man". Fourth , I have shown
fhe intrinsic implicafions 0/ confracepfion/or marifallove. which shows
the real gravity of the moral disorder involved in contraception . This
argument, which stresses the personalistic features of the virtue of chastity,
fully conforms, I think , to the leading perspective involved in the teaching
of " Humanae Vitae". It finally provides an answer to the last question I
intended to deal with: " Why and in which precise sense can contraception
be called a violation of natural law?"
What is natural law? It is, as I understand it, the order established by
human reason in man's natural inclinations.40 These inclinations are given
by nature , as e.g., the natural inclination to the conjunction of male and
female . But this inclination , although being natural and, as a created
reality, a participation in the eternal law of the Creator, is not yet natural
law. For "law" is a binding guide or rule to performing right aCfions
proceeding from reason and will. Natural law, rather, is the o rder 0/
pracfical reason established in this inclination, which includes and
presupposes that practical reason has already grasped this natural
inclination as a human good to be pursued within the order of reason.41 In
our case, this order of reason is the order of loving, mutual self-giving and
procreative responsibilty, both inseparably connected , an order established
in the sexual drives . Spouses who modify their sexual behavior according
to the demands of procreative responsibility act according to natural law;
they live the virtue of chastity (for natural law makes us live the virtues).
In the case of contraception , the situation is quite different: Here the
entire natural inclination to conjunction of male and female is withdrawn
from the context of procreation and the requirement of being ordered by
reason of being dominated by reason-informed will. It is withdrawn
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from the requirement of virtuous self-control. Of course, as I have already
remarked above, the adoption of a contraceptive policy is also a kind of
rational and voluntary dominion and "control" over sexuality. But it is not
a kind of virtuous dominion; that is to say, it is not a dominion which
conforms to the anthropological truth ofthe substantial unity of the body
and the spirit, because it is not a sort of dominion which informs sexual
acts, but dominion that only refers to procreative consequences of sexual
acts; thus , in themselves they need not anymore be considered as a possible
cause of new life and need not, therefore, be responsibly modified .
Contraceptive dominion, rather, is a kind of "technical" dominion over the
possible cause of new life and over the human drives which lead to
effectively causing it. Contraceptive behavior produces a profound
alienation of the personal selffrom its body, because it treats the body - in
a "technical" way - as a mere object, destroying its subjectivity character.
So, in the originally spiritual act of mutual self-giving effectuated in the
conjugal act, contracepting spouses do not give themselves anymore in
their totality as bodily beings.42 We could interpret this act in two different
ways, though neither of them is satisfactory: spouses either perform an act
of spiritual love by merely using their bodies (each one their own and the
one of the other) as something like an instrument for expressing this love
or they perform a mere bodily act which is not informed by spiritual love
and , therefore, tends to be mere self-gratification. The former is what
contracepted sexuality intends to be; the latter is what it actually tends to
become. In any case, contraceptionjalsifies sexuality.
When talking about "technical" dominion I do not want to refer to the
"artificial" character of most contraceptive techniques as opposed to
"natural". "Technical" behavior, rather, means a kind of behavior as
opposed to "virtuolfs" behavior. The facilities of artificial devices only render
easier and "technical" behavior more tempting. Its wrongness, however, does
not consist in its artificiality, but rather in its fundamental "amorality" in its
denial of the requirements of moral virtue. In the case of contraception, this
denial is - by its very structure: objectively - absolute and radical. Thus, it
contradicts the basic requirement of a natural law-guided human behavior.
Contraception not only signifies acting against some determinate precept of
natural law, but rather it withdraws sexual inclination from the requirement
of being informed by natural law at all. It eliminates at its very root the
ordering efficiency of natural law, which includes human reason, reasonguided freedom and freedom's responsibility. It leads to a bodi~v behavior in
which the "image of God" is no longer present , and therefore it is a sort of
behavior inappropriate to fulfill that to which marital love essentially is
called: to cooperate with God's creative life-giving love. I think that is what
the encyclical "Humanae Vitae" wanted to teach us. The sadly obvious
consequences of contraceptive behavior - some of them mentioned in No.
17 of the encyclical - may show that this teaching was truly prophetical,
even if its prophetical truth will be misjudged exactly in the same measure as
procreative irresponsibility spreads.
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I have treated the problem of contraception from a strictly philosophical
viewpoint. Therefore, I did not deal with theological and pastoral
questions. In any event, pastoral care has to take its measure from the
"truth about man". And moral theology should not only respect, but
integrate the philosophical (anthropological and ethical) insight about
man as a moral agent. 43 Practical demands which spring from this "truth
about man" may be considered as hard. The alternative to respecting this
truth, however, is even much harder; it is not a desirable alternative. The
Church always has taught that - in the given situation of fallen mankind
- all the exigencies of natural law cannot be fulfilled except by the help of
redeeming grace which, as far as human weakness is concerned, has a
healing power. Thus, the truth may be hard, but the means offered by the
Church to overcome this hardship are most efficient. They permit man not
only to strive for sanctity, but to fully develop thereby his very humanity.
This striving always has been the seal of authentic Christian life, which is
not the least also called to defend worldly goods such as sexuality, human
love and marriage against their depravation by a world marked by sin and
the human weakness springing from it. The Church's mission is not to
condemn anybody, but to illuminate man's conscience and to
simultaneously offer God's mercy and grace, - faithful to the mission of
the Christ Who has been sent by the Father not to judge this world, but to
save it. 44
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further intention which may render periodic continence morally illicit is not what
characterizes contraception already in and of itself (intrinsically); it may therefore not be
called a "contraceptive intent" without risking confusion and without answering the
question of why contraception is wrong before having asked the question properly. As like
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as to analyze periodic continence. also to understand contracept ion we have. at least , to
distinguish the two following questions (see again G.E. M. Anscombe. Contraception and
Chastity. 01'. cit .. p . 18): "First: is the sort of act we contemplate doing something that it's all
right to do? Second: are our further or surrounding intentions all right? (... ) Contraceptive
intercourse fails on the first count."
6. See for this: J . M. Finnis. "H umanae Vitae: Its Background and Aftermath." In:
Internat ional Reviell' of Natural Fami/r Planning IV (1980) . 141-153.
7. This has been nicely pointed out by T. G . Belmans. I.e sens objecti[ de /'agir humain.
Pour relire 10 morale conjugale de Saint Thomas (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice
Vaticana . 1980). pp. 327-411. For "physicalism" in actual moral theology, see also my
Naw r als Grundlage der Moral (Ins bruck- Wien: Tyrolia . 1987). B. Haring. in his above
cited article for example (183) . simply equals the natural patterns involved in sexuality with
"biological functions" which "may be interfered with and even destroyed if it is necessary
for the well being of the person". which according to him is a mere medical problem. The
contraceptive pill is regarded by Hanng as something that "preserves the ovule which. here
and now. is not needed because procreation would be irresponsible" (185) .
.
8. Except by quoting sentences (or fragments thereof) taken out of their context. of
which C. Curran. 01'. cit.. p. 160. provides a typical example.
9. G. Grise z. A Nell' Formulation ofa Natural-La ,,' Argument against Contraception.
In The Thomist. XXX (1966). p. 343.
10. See my Natur als Grundlage der Moral. 01'. cit .. pp. 108 ff.
II. This latter example is given by G. Grisez. The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol. I.
Christian Moral Principles (Chicago : Franciscan Herald Press. 1983). p. 105; the former by
G. E. M. Anscombe . 01'. cit .. p. 87.
12. An author like G. Martelet (see his article " Morale conjugale et vie chretienne." In
NOUl'e l/e Re\'lle Theologique. 87 (1965). pp. 245-266) has. indeed . pointed out the moral
relevance of sexuality. Therefore. his argument against contraception has not to be
su bsumed under the "perverted faculty argument". The anthropological arguments which I
will use later are not very different from Martelet's. But. as 1 have remarked above .
Martele!'s argument failed by omitting to show why and how his anthropology becomes
releva nt for judging single human actions. He neither worked with the concept of moral
virtue. nor did he engage in action analysis. So. as it seems to me. he missed the point. Also
man's eating. which aims at nutrition. is moral/I' releva nt (because self-preservation of the
individual is) . The problem is how this relevance will affect the judgment about single
performances of nutritive acts .
13. Summa Contra Gentiles 11. 122.
14. I refer to the last presentation of this argument. published by its authors in common:
G. Grise z. J. Bo yle. J . Finnis. W. E. May: "Every Marital Act ought to be Open to New
Life": Toward a Clearer Understanding. 1988; published in The Thomist. 52:3 (/988) and
(ill all Italian version) ill Anthropotes. IV : I (1988). I wish to thank Germain Grisez for
ha ving sent me the manuscript before its publication. I was pleased to see that this last
vers ion of the argument takes into consideration some objections I had occasion to raise in
common discussions about the subject. Here is also the place to thank both Germain Grisez
and John Finnis for raising some very useful objections to my own argument and having
helped me thereby to introduce some important refinements.
15. See my Natur als Grundlage der Moral. cit.. 367-374.
16. As it see ms to ha ve been the case in the theological working paper of the majority
group of the famous Pontificial Commission on Population. Family and Births. See for this
G. Grise?: Dualism and the Nell' Moralill'. In: M. Zalba: L'Agire Morale (Alii de l
COllgres,\'o Interna:!iollale: Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario Vol. 5). Napoli
1974 323-330. See also my Natur als Grundlage del' Moral. cit.. for a more detailed
examination of spiritualism and anthropological dualism underlying some influential
schools of actua l moral theology (mostly influenced by Karl Rahner).
17. Whereas the majorit y group of the mentioned Pontifical Commission wrote:
)(Jeclll7ditas hiologica ill sjaeram humanam assumi debet". a statement which Grisez.
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in his above cited article, rightly reproaches for implying anthropological dualism.
18. The misunderstanding and confusion between "function" and "meaning" is obvious
in B. Haring: The Inseparability of the Unitive-Procreative Functions of the Marital Act.,
op. cit. , p. 178 (already this title expresses the misunderstanding). "The expression 'open to
the transmission of life' has much less meaning now. The marital act during pregnancy is
acknowledged as being 'open to new life' , and so is the conjugal act in the infecund periods
despite the fact that scientific calculation might practically eliminate the probability of any
transmission of life. It is unfortunate that Pope Paul uses the same phrase in referring to the
'constant doctrine' of the Church when historically the expression originated at a time when
scientific theories on infecund periods were unknown." Haring still thinks in biological
patterns instead of adopting an intentional (moral) viewpoint.
19. Of course, without a basic, naturally given procreative "function" of sexuality, no
sexual act could bear a procreative "meaning". But, even if "meaning" has its roots in a
"function", as the intentional content of a human act it possesses a certain independence
from the actual fertility of the act. This follows from integration of the " natural" into the
higher order of the spirit.
20. Let me quote again Haring, op. cit ., p. 188: "It is not easy to explain the relationship
of the procreative to the unitive good in the marriage of proven sterile partners. Their
marriage can fulfill the unitive meaning while it cannot truly and really fulfill a procreative
role ." Again , the same misunderstanding seems to be at work. But afterwards , surprisingly,
Haring affirms: "However, I think the combined functions are not totally excluded in such
marriages , in which the partners truly consider each other as spouses, and love each other in
a way that would keep them open f or the parental vocation were such within the range of
possiblity. One who sincere ly loves his spouse as spouse would not refuse to have him or her
as parent of his or her child if the choice were given " (the emphasis is mine). This is
surprising, because it is entirely correct; Hiiring here focuses the problem in a clearly
intentional way . If he had treated the problem of contraception in the same way , he would
have been able to understand the encyclical's teaching.
21. See I-ll , q. 18, a. 10, where Aquinas properly says: "Species moralium actuum
constituuntur ex formis , prout sunt a ratione conceptae." But the species is formed by the
object of an act (which includes a lso the goal of the intention, which as well is a specifying
object). For a detailed interpretation of this doctrine see my NalUr als Grundlage der
Moral, cit., pp. 91-98; 318-374. Compare with this the rather naturalistic and biological
intent of defining the object of the marital act made by the "earlier" Josef Fuchs, Biologie
und Ehemoral, in Gregorianum 2 (1962) , pp. 225-253.
22. Anscombe , G. E. M.,lntenrion, Second Edition, 1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1979)
p. 66 (§ 35).
23. Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe: Conrraception and Chastity, op. cit. , p. 17. There is an
ambiguity in the term "intention". "Intention" always signifies to relate to something by
one's will; where there is an act of the will, there is an intention informed by practical
reason . Human acts are chosen and , therefore , referred to with an act of deliberate
(rationally guided) willingness . Thus , "objects" of human acts have to be described in terms
of intentions. See also Anscombe: You can have Sex withoUl Children, op. cit., p. 86: "We
a lways need to distinguish the intention embodied in an action from the further intention
with which the action is done ; I am here concerned only with the former. Whatever ulterior
intentions you mayor may not have, the question first arises: what intention is inherent in
the action you are actually performing? It is one thing to have or not have certain further
intentions, another to modify the intentional action you in fact perform. What concerns us
is the question: what are you here and now doing on purpose - whatever your ulterior
aims?" What one is "here and now doing on purpose" , and this means what one is
intentionally doing, this precisely is called the object of the act.
24. For this I refer again to Anscombe, You can have Sex without Children , op. cit .,
p. 85.
25. Precisely this was ove rl ooked in a formerly famous article by the "earlier" Josef
Fuchs, (Biologie und Ehemoral. Gregorianum 43 [1962]. pp. 225-253), who considered the
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marita l act as ha vi ng two objects o r "fin es o peris". a primary a nd a seco nd ary o ne. It ma y
seem parad ox ica l. but Fuchs was not a ble to co nceive the o bj ecti ve unit y of the marital act
because of hi s co nsidering "objects". a nd es pecia ll y the "procreative meaning". as a kind of
"natural functions". and not as the co ntent of int ent io nal actio ns. As an exam ple of
"biologism", this art icle is still illumina ting.
26. To a very simil a r res ult comes T. G. Belmans, Le sens ohjecli(de ragir humain, op,
cil .. p. 425 . He re the o bject of the co njugal act is defined as foll ows: ""union sex uelle entre
conjoints, ouverte quant so n sens vecu, it la transmission de la vie." Th e German editi on of
Belmans' ve ry accurate study puts it even better (see: Der objekli\'e Sinn des m enschlichen
Handelns. , , ,[Vallendar: Patri s Verlag. 1984]4 78 f.): "die gesc hlechtliche Hinga be a n den
Ehegatten" (= "sex ua l se lf-gi vin g to the spo use"). "die inbezug auf ihren erlebni s ma ssige n
Sinngehalt fUr eine mbgliche Weitergabe des Le ben s offe nge halten wird" (W ha t, more
simpl y, cou ld be ex pressed as "intentionall y open to procreation"),
27. I wish to emphasize that I d o not overlook thereb y the poss ibilit y of engaging in
sexual intercourse oUlside mar ria ge, The point is that sexual interco urse ha s esse ntiall y a
marilal (or bridal) meaning. Marital union is not only a "poss ibilit y" of pe rfo rming sex ual
intercourse; but the very nature of sexuality. considered as a full y human a nd pers onal
reality . co nsi sts j ust in its marital meaning: Full perso nal mutual se lf-giving of two human
persons belongin g to different sexes, without an y restrictions and forever. Sexual
intercourse outside marriage is not consummation of Ihis kind of love: it , thus , contradicts
to its objeclive meaning. According to the foregoing anal ys is . th e following suggesti o n may
be added: The traditional doctrine about the "two goals of marriage" ("fines ma trim o nii")
does not refer to exactly the same as the one about the "two mea nin gs of the conjugal act",
The "finis secundarius" ("mutuum obseq uium", mutual assistance) , as such, ha s nothing to
do with the conjugal act , th e "Io ving-union-meaning" of which obviously is not equal to the
goal of "mutual assis tance". Thi s "secondary goal of marriage" rather refe rs to marria ge as
a specific kind of human social realitr that, according to traditional teaching, is an
association of male and female primaril y (basically) specified by its task of serv ing
transmis sion of life. The "conjugal act", however, plainly is not the sa me as "marital
communit y" ; it is rather the consumm ation of the very lovefrom which marital community
springs. Talking about the object of the conjugal act, therefore, is something concep tually
different from talking about the goals of marriage. In the "object" of the conjugal act , the
aspect of "loving union" (its uniti ve meaning) is just fundamental (and not a t all
"secondary"), and as such it involves the procrea tive meaning (which is not "primary", but
"inseparably connected" with the former). This precisel y, the intrinsically procreati ve
meaning of lo ve betwee n mal e and female , is the very reason why procreation is the
primarily specifying goal of marital community; it owns this goal just insofar as "ma rita l
community" is a community of lo ving perso ns inclined to sexual union . So we ma y
conclude that the question of the "two goals of marriage" and the question of the "two
meanings of the conjugal act" are two quite different, though closel y correlated , questions.
About fift y yea rs ago, a famou s theologian , He rbert Doms, who opposed the , at the time
generally held opinion according to which procreation was co nsidered to be the "primary
goal" or the "finis operis" of the conjugal act , tried to elaborate a "more personalistic" view.
Unfortunatel y, by overlooking why this teaching was distorted, he was misled to falsely
contending that " loving union" could equally be considered as the "finis primarius" of
marriage (and of sexuality altogether), while in reality "loving union" has to be called the
fundamental a spect of the object of the conjugal aCI. Actual moral theology is still suffering
the consequences of this confusion.
28. About Ulpian and Aquinas, see the article by William E. Ma y: "The Mea ning and
Nature of the Natural La w in Thomas Aquinas," in : American Journal of Jurisprudence,
22 (1977), pp. 168-189, and the references given there .
29. See II-II , q . 156, a,2.
30. See Thomas Aquinas , "Virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud qua m quaedam
dispositi o sive forma sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione" ( De Virtutibus in
communi, a.9).
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31. See e.g., I-II , q. 56, a. 4 where Aquinas explains that the sensual appetites are "natae
rationi obedire", so as to conclude: "Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse
subiectum virtutis humanae: sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat
rationem ." The point of the virtues of temperance and force, hence, consists in rendering
sensual appetites to be principles of human acts, which is equal to fully integrating them
into the context of human action, according to their basic anthropological truth (based in
substantial unity). This obviously does not apply to bodily functions which are not "natae
rationi obedire" such as the heart, the liver, the digestive apparatus , etc. They are not
princi pIes of human acts but organic functions of the body. Of course, also in sexuality such
mere organic functions are involved. But the sexual drive itself is much more than such a
function.
32. This is the method adopted by Aquinas; see the Prologue to II-II: " ... peccatum,
cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis." And : "est autem eadem
materia circa quam virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt." So, the
method consists in "totam materiam moralem ad considerationem virtutum reducere" .
33. Cf. the well argued article by J. Bajda, "Verantwortete Elternschaft und
Antikonzeption", in E. Wenisch (ed.): Elternschaft und Menschenwurde (Vallendar: Patris
Verlag, 1984) 243-260.
34. Notice that this does not apply to the case of naturally given sterility, for this
condition does not imply a choice of rendering needless the modification of sexual
behavior. So the intentional relation to naturally given and voluntarily produced sterility is
different. It is precisely this intentional relation which specifies and shapes further actions.
Of course infertility by nature or disease also may be abused.
35 . . Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 18-19.
36. If I talk about "operative integration" I do not talk about "ontological integration". I
do not wish to say that sexuality requires being "humanized". Sexuality is human by its very
ontological status (because of the substantial unity of body and spirit). "Operative
integration" means to take into account this ontological status while acting.
37. See for this J. Finnis, "Personal Integrity, Sexual Morality and Responsible
Parenthood," in Anthropos (now: Anthropotes) I (1985), pp. 43-55. For a more thorough
analysis see K. Wojtyla , Love and Responsibility, Part III.
38. Cf. R. Spaemann , "Wovon handelt die Moraltheologie? Bemerkungen eines
Philosophen," in lnternationale Katholische ZeitschriJt 6 (1977), 307 f.
39. This is why , in order to explain the connection between contraception and abortion,
there is no need to interpret contraception as being essentially contra life or even in analogy
with "homicide". I argue just the other way around : The connection between abortion and
contraception is sufficiently explained by the fact that abortion, insofar as it is promoted by
spreading contraception, is characterized by a contraceptive mentality, that is, by a
mentality which excludes the responsibility for the procreative consequences of one's
sexual behavior. The basic problem is not that people do not want to have children; the
basic and first problem is that they want to have sex without children.
40. For further details I refer to my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit. A summary is to
be found in M. Rhonheimer, "Die Konstitutierung des Naturgesetzes und sittlichnormativer Objektivitat durch die praktische Vernunft ," in Autori Vari: Persona, Verita e
Morale. Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Teologia Morale Roma 7-12 Aprile 1986
(Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 1988) 859-884. See also the above mentioned article by
William E. May, The Meaning and Nature of the Natural Law ....
41. We may consider natural law either "formaliter" or "materialiter". "Formaliter"
considered, natural law is ordinatio rationis, the (universal) prescriptive acts of natural
reason by which the order of reason is established in man's inclinations. "Materialiter"
considered , natural laws are the natural inclinations insofar as they are integrated in the
order of reason. Both considerations refer to the same reality; the former, however, aims at
indicating the very essence of natural law; the latter stresses on its contents. As I think to
have shown in my work about this subject, natural law is essentially the work of man's
practical reason. Aquinas calls it, like "law" generally, an "opus rationis" (I-II, q. 94, a . I)
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and "aliquid a ratione constitut um" (ibid.). When talking about natura l la w, the "reason"
whic h is referred to is natural reason ("ratio naturalis").
42. This often quoted ant hropological insight , en unciated , e.g. , in Familiaris Consortio,
No. 32, is, as it seems to me, not evident by itself. However true it may be, in a philosophical
co nte xt one has to argue for it , at least if one deals with a case of true responsible
parenthood. With the foregoing ana lysis , I indeed claim to have provided such an argument
which gives plain evidence of what J o hn Paul" affi rms in Familiaris Consortio. Therefore,
I do not agree with those who si mpl y repeat this teaching as a n argumenr, using it as if were
self-evide nt.
43. That precisely this full integration of the philosophical m oralis consideratio int o the
hi gher co ntext of moral theology may be considered as a specific feature of Aq uinas's
Secunda pars of his Summa Theologica has been convincingly shown by G. Abba: Lex et
virtus. Studi sull'evoluzione della dottrina morale di san Tommaso d'Aquino. (Rome: LAS
1983). See also my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit. , 195.
44. See John, 3, 17.
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